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Abstract
We study the price-setting behavior in a competitive market for used cars and
provide empirical evidence for coarse information processing. Based on detailed
field data from one of Europe’s largest online marketplaces for automotive vehi-
cles, we document systematic and sizable price discontinuities at salient car-age
and mileage thresholds. The price difference between two otherwise identical
cars across registration years (where one was first registered in January and the
other in December of the previous year) is up to five times larger than that
between two cars first registered in any two subsequent months within a reg-
istration year. A similar pattern can be observed in the mileage dimension at
10,000-km odometer marks, which is in line with earlier findings by Lacetera
et al. (2012). Being able to study discontinuities along two dimensions of the
same good allows us to further our understanding towards a more general no-
tion of inattentive behavior. While our results are compatible with a behavioral
model of limited attention, we also provide evidence for a more traditional ex-
planation based on search frictions.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory suggests that a rational agent should incorporate all relevant infor-
mation when making a decision. However, at least since Simon (1955), economists
have proposed models that relax this strong assumption. In these models, individuals
simplify complex decisions, for example, by processing only a subset of information.
Moreover, recent empirical research convincingly documents that consumers fail to ef-
ficiently process available information and instead rely on heuristic evaluation rules.1
In particular, Lacetera et al. (2012) analyze data from US used-car auctions, find sys-
tematic and substantial price drops at 10,000-mile odometer marks, and explain this
pattern with a model of inattention based on left-digit bias (the tendency to focus on
the left-most digit of a number and partially ignoring other digits).2
We use comprehensive field data on used-car offers from the German website
mobile.de, one of Europe’s largest online marketplaces for automotive vehicles, and
are able to replicate the Lacetera et al. (2012) findings. But the German context
allows for an additional line of inquiry, which helps us to gain a better understanding
of the mechanism driving our results: In Germany, cars have an official and legally
mandated documentation record that makes the year (or “vintage”) and the month
of first registration verifiable information.3 Importantly, the US “model-year” concept
is neither used for German cars nor the German market as a whole.4 Instead of
issuing (or advertising) a new model each year, German manufacturers produce a
given model generation without significant changes for a period of several years.
Hence, our dataset provides the unique opportunity to study a second dimension of
coarse information processing within the same decision problem.
We find strong threshold effects on prices at first-registration-year changes. All
else equal, the price differential between two cars, across vintages (where one car
was first registered in January and the other in December of the previous year) is
up to five times larger than that between two cars first registered in any two subse-
quent months within the same vintage. We document our results by implementing
a regression-discontinuity design and by performing various robustness and placebo
tests. A linear approximation of a limited-attention model in the spirit of DellaVigna
(2009) and Lacetera et al. (2012) suggests that the inattention parameter – capturing
1See, among others, Malmendier and Lee (2011) and Brown et al. (2010) on internet auctions, or
Chetty et al. (2009) and Finkelstein (2009) on taxes and tolls.
2For example, cars with odometer values between 59,000 and 59,999 miles are sold only slightly
cheaper than cars with odometer readings between 58,000 and 58,999 miles, whereas the price drop
to the 60,000–60,999 miles bin is substantially larger.
3The official notation states the month first and the vintage second, divided by a forward slash. For
instance, a car first registered on April 24th, 2016 would be labeled as 04/2016.
4A model-year concept would have confounded our analysis, given its inherent salience of the
registration year where, say, the “New 2016 Toyota Corolla” would be advertised on billboards, TV
spots, and magazine ads.
1
the discontinuous price drops at thresholds – lies in the neighborhood of 0.3 to 0.4 for
both dimensions, which is well within the range of parameter estimates documented
in the literature.
While our results build on existing work on mileage discontinuities, we provide
new evidence for the effects of inattention in another dimension, namely product
age, which is applicable to a broader set of situations than odometer readings. In
addition, both product dimensions differ with respect to their endogeneity, which
generates contrasting predictions about the incidence of manipulative sorting: The
date of first registration is an innate and unalterable feature of a used car, whereas
its mileage can be strategically influenced by varying the date it is put up for sale.5
As a consequence, we should only expect anomalous bunching of car offers around
salient thresholds in the mileage, but not in the vintage dimension. Moreover, study-
ing discontinuities along two dimensions of the same good allows us to further our un-
derstanding towards a more general notion of inattention: Such a framework would
be readily applicable to a wide set of domains where underlying continuous charac-
teristics are mapped into discrete categories (such as classifications of French wine,
star-based reviews of hotels, or ratings of financial assets) and for which “inefficient”
price discontinuities might also exist.
The paramount role of information provision in online markets is underlined by
Lewis (2011). Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) document it for the used-car market
also studied by Lacetera et al. (2012). Busse et al. (2013) add to the insights from the
wholesale market studied in Lacetera et al. (2012) and document that price drops at
10,000-mile odometer thresholds are also prevalent for retail consumers. They argue
that effects are driven by consumers who devote too little attention to evaluating ve-
hicle mileage. Limited attention has also been documented for purchase decisions in
other markets. For instance, Malmendier and Lee (2011) analyze individual bidding
behavior in auctions on eBay and find that people tend to anchor on an irrelevant re-
tail price for a board game if the seller mentions that price in the product description.
At the same time, many of the winning bids exceed a more relevant outside option,
the so-called “buy-it-now” price, which is a fixed strike price set by the seller as an
alternative to the auction process.6 Pope (2009) shows that patients strongly react to
changes in coarse rankings of hospitals while ignoring more informative continuous
measures of hospital quality. In a similar vein, the degree of salience of taxes appears
5Note that while the date of first registration is an exogenous feature when selling a used car, it is
certainly endogenous to the initial purchase decision when the car was new. We discuss this issue in
Section 3.1.
6Schneider (2016) offers a follow-up comment on Malmendier and Lee (2011) and suggests that
their results are potentially driven not by limited attention but by specific features of eBay’s search
filters that do not necessarily return all relevant alternatives for a specific good. As a result, auction
prices may exceed fixed prices because consumers are simply unaware that the fixed-price option is
available for the item in question.
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to affect consumption behavior. For example, Chetty et al. (2009) conduct a field ex-
periment at a grocery store and find that posting tax-inclusive prices reduces demand.
Finkelstein (2009) shows that reduced salience of road tolls (caused by the introduc-
tion of electronic toll-collection systems) leads to higher tolls. Analyzing stock market
data, Gilbert et al. (2012) provide evidence that investors with limited attention have
an incentive to focus on summary statistics rather than individual pieces of informa-
tion. They analyze the market response to the U.S. Leading Economic Index (LEI), a
macroeconomic release that is purely a summary statistic, and show that the LEI an-
nouncement has an impact on aggregate stock returns, return volatility, and trading
volume. In a recent article, Luca (2016) studies consumer demand for restaurants
and documents discontinuous responses to online ratings. We add to these findings
by demonstrating that inattention affects high-stake purchase decisions even if the
relevant information is readily available at basically no cost and by being able to
study discontinuities along two dimensions of the same good.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 presents the graphical and regression analysis for vintage and mileage dis-
continuities. An extensive set of robustness and placebo tests is summarized in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 discusses the implications of our results and concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data source: The mobile.de website
We collected detailed information on more than 63,000 cars offered during July and
August of 2009 on mobile.de, one of Europe’s largest online marketplaces for automo-
tive vehicles. Founded in 1996, mobile.de takes the role of an intermediary between
supply and demand within a two-sided market. It provides a platform for sellers
to place advertisements for new and used cars in exchange for a fixed fee, and it
provides a free comprehensive search tool for prospective buyers to screen through
roughly 1.5 million total offers. The company itself is not involved in the purchase or
the sale of a vehicle and a successful transaction does not invoke any fees.
To borrow from mobile.de’s self description, prospective buyers “can limit search
results by setting individual preferences and like this obtain customized offers with
just a few clicks”, providing them “with an overview of the market and information
about prices”.7 The same is true for sellers who want to evaluate their car before
offering it for sale.
Figure 1 shows the interface on mobile.de’s main page. It is a simplified search form
that allows to filter for makes, models, and a number of other basic characteristics.
An advanced search form provides a large additional set of filter options. Conducting
7Source: http://cms.mobile.de/en/company/portrait_mobile.html; last accessed: April 24th, 2016
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Figure 1. Main page – www.mobile.de
Figure 2. List of search results – www.mobile.de
either type of a search, returns a list of all vehicles that match the chosen filters. By
default, the search results are sorted by price, and their main attributes are summa-
rized as shown in Figure 2. This preview explicitly states the first-registration date
(e.g. “04/2016”, if the car was first registered in April of 2016) besides additional
information on price, mileage, color, motor power, and some additional features. It is
also possible to save a specific car for later access (to “park” a vehicle), and to directly
compare it to other selected cars. Figure 3 depicts an example profile page for a car
offer, which is accessed by clicking the respective search result.
Since mobile.de is not an auction market, we only observe the asking prices of sell-
ers. These may deviate from final prices due to negotiations during the actual sale
of the car. However, for this to be a concern for our analysis, these deviations would
have to systematically differ between pre- and post-threshold cars, which seems im-
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Figure 3. Car details – www.mobile.de
plausible. Nevertheless, we took two steps to validate that the asking price is indeed
a reasonable proxy for the final price in this market environment: First, on mobile.de
sellers have the option to declare the asking price as either “fixed” or “negotiable”.
For our analysis, we exclusively collected data from offers with fixed prices. Second,
we extensively searched the web for guides on “how to buy a used car” or “how to
negotiate a good deal when buying a used car”. While there is an abundance of such
handbooks, there is no mention of inflated prices (and bargaining opportunities) for
January cars or that December cars are generally better deals. We regard the notable
absence of such suggestions to be supportive of our argument. For simplicity, we use
the terms “price” and “asking price” interchangeably throughout the paper.
2.2 Sample composition
Due to scarce resources during data collection, we limited our sample to the best-
selling car model by each of the five leading German manufacturers. The five chosen
models are also among the top ten of Germany’s overall vehicle population according
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to the Federal Office for Motor Vehicles (Kraftfahrtbundesamt/KBA).8 Specifically, we
collected information on 14,780 Volkswagen (VW) Golf (KBA-rank 1), 10,841 Opel
Astra (KBA rank 2), 18,470 BMW 3 series (KBA rank 4), 14,219 Audi A4 (KBA rank 7),
and 5,030 Mercedes Class A (KBA rank 9).9
We selected cars whose date of first registration falls between December 2007
and January 2000. Having collected the data in the summer of 2009, this implies
that the youngest car in our sample is 20 months old, whereas the oldest car has
an age of 116 months (roughly nine and a half years). This selection guarantees the
exclusion of a particular market segment with quite idiosyncratic features, known
as “Jahreswagen”. Such cars are typically given to employees for roughly one year
as part of their compensation package and differ substantially (both with respect to
their characteristics and the way they were used) from privately owned vehicles that
dominate the used-car market.10
Because the introduction of a new model generation affects prices substantially,
we control for such model revisions. Information on the exact dates of the respective
market launches are available through the so-called Schwacke list, the Deutsche Au-
tomobil Treuhand (DAT), and the manufacturers’ websites. For an overview of model
updates that occurred in our sample, see Table A.1 in Appendix A, and note that
model updates do not happen around year changes in our sample. However, control-
ling for model revisions is not trivial because we only know when factories switched
production from one generation to the next but cannot distinguish if a given car in
our sample is in fact the new model or rather the previous one that has been sitting
at the dealer’s lot for a few months. For our main specifications, we classify a car as
having undergone a model update if it was first registered more than three months
after the factories switched production. In Section 4 we document that our results
are robust to alternative definitions of these model-generation indicators.
2.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the main variables used for analysis. These
include a whole roster of car features that will likely affect the seller’s asking price.
The two most important determinants for our analysis are a car’s age and mileage.
The age of a car is measured in months and normalized relative to the youngest
8Source: http://www.kba.de.
9KBA ranks not reported were either held by non-German automakers or by other models of VW
(Passat, Polo) and Opel (Corsa).
10This Jahreswagen option is particularly attractive in Germany because of its tax-preferred status,
which makes it a hidden subsidy to the car industry. Results – which are available upon request – that
include Jahreswagen show that our general results remain stable while discontinuities are unsystem-
atic for this market segment.
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Table 1. Summary statistics of key variables
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Price (in EUR) 63,340 13,209 5,909 1,750 48,890
Car age (in months) 63,340 39.14 25.82 1 96
Mileage (in km) 63,340 87,338 51,629 1,000 1,499,000
Horsepower (in PS) 63,289 97.26 28.94 44 309
Indicator variables:
- Diesel engine 63,322 0.58 0.49 0 1
- Automatic transmission 63,018 0.21 0.40 0 1
- Metallic paint 63,340 0.79 0.41 0 1
- Air conditioning 63,340 0.97 0.17 0 1
- Leather trim 63,340 0.16 0.37 0 1
- Airbag 63,340 0.49 0.50 0 1
- Power windows 63,340 0.96 0.21 0 1
- Sunroof 63,340 0.18 0.38 0 1
- Four-wheel drive 63,340 0.05 0.22 0 1
- Seat heating 63,340 0.45 0.50 0 1
- Cruise control 63,340 0.43 0.50 0 1
- Private seller 63,340 0.13 0.34 0 1
Notes: Car age is measured relative to December 2007. N denotes the number of obser-
vations, St. Dev. stands for standard deviation, Min and Max are the minimum and the
maximum value for each variable, respectively.
car in the sample.11 Additional car characteristics that are useful as control variables
include engine power and several special features for which we define indicator vari-
ables. The final row of Table 1 indicates that roughly 87% of offers come from pro-
fessional car dealers.
Unconditional correlations between these variables are in line with conventional
wisdom: Car prices are strongly negatively correlated with car age (ρ = −0.85)
and with mileage (ρ = −0.78). Conversely, horsepower (ρ = 0.45), diesel engines
(ρ = 0.11), five-door options (ρ = 0.16), and all other special features are positively
correlated with prices. While not listed in Table 1, another determinant for the price
of a car is its color. We therefore also define a set of color indicators to control for
their impact on prices, where the effects are measured relative to the color black.
We find that prices are indeed somewhat responsive to different colors. To improve
readability, however, we omit the coefficients for the color dummies in the regression
tables that follow.
11The information on the month and year of first registration are stored in the variables fr_month
∈ [1,12] and fr_year ∈ [2000,2007], respectively. We combine these to define the variable totalage
∈ [1,96] that captures the precise age of a car measured in months: totalage≡ 12 · (2007− fr_year)+
(13− fr_month). As a result, the youngest car in our sample (first-registration date of 12/2007) will
be assigned a totalage value of 1 month.
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Figure 4. Distribution of car mileage
Notes: Plotted is the distribution of car mileage, measured in 1,000-km bins.
Vertical lines indicate 10,000-km thresholds.
Figure 5. Distribution of car age
Notes: Plotted is the distribution of car age, measured in months (relative to
the youngest car in the sample). Vertical lines indicate vintage thresholds.
Note that our two key explanatory variables – mileage and vintage of a car – are
self-reported. While this is unlikely to be a concern for the latter because the date of
first registration is officially mandated and easily verifiable, we suspect our odometer
data to be more susceptible to measurement error. In fact, when plotting the raw
mileage data (not depicted here for lack of space), we observe a discontinuous distri-
bution, where much of the mass is on exact multiples of 1,000 km, which indicates
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Figure 6. Distribution of car prices
Notes: Plotted is the distribution of car prices, measured in EUR 1,000 bins.
considerable rounding. A similar picture emerges in Figure 4, where the distribution
of car mileage is measured in 1,000-km bins: There is considerably more mass in the
neighborhood to the left of 10,000-km thresholds (including the threshold itself) than
to the right of the thresholds – a pattern that we discuss in Section 3.2. The distribu-
tion of car age is depicted in Figure 5. We find some fluctuations across registration
months with a relative mass between roughly 18 and 40 months. Importantly, there
are no systematic jumps around vintage thresholds but the data follows the seasonal
pattern of first registrations that the Federal Office for Motor Vehicles records since
1970: There are generally few registrations in winter, then numbers pick up in spring,
peak in summer, and decrease throughout the fall before reaching the low winter
levels again. Finally, Figure 6 reveals that the distribution of our dependent variable




We begin our empirical analysis by plotting the price data as a function of car age. In
Figure 7, each dot represents the average adjusted12 residual asking price (after con-
trolling for a fifth-order age polynomial, mileage, horsepower, model updates, and
12To facilitate the readability of Figure 7, we add the estimated age polynomial and a constant back
into the residual.
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Figure 7. Average adjusted residual car prices by car age
Notes: Plotted are average adjusted residual car prices (after controlling for
car characteristics) as a function of car age measured on a monthly basis. Age
is measured relative to the date of first registration 12/2007. Vertical dashed
lines indicate vintage (or registration year) thresholds. Solid lines represent
linear fits within each vintage.
other car features) for all cars first registered in a given month of a given year.13
The vertical lines represent the vintage thresholds. As one would expect, prices de-
crease with age. While the decline in prices is continuous and approximately linear
within each vintage, there are systematic and substantial discontinuities between vin-
tages. This pattern is consistent with inattentive price-setting behavior where too
much weight is given to the registration year of a car as opposed to the much more
informative registration date.
Regression analysis
To corroborate the graphical analysis and to obtain numerical estimates for the ob-
served price discontinuities, we continue with econometric analysis. Our identifica-
tion strategy is based on a regression discontinuity (RD) design (see Lee and Lemieux
(2010) for an overview). Particularly, to identify the discontinuities at vintage thresh-






yi + f (ai)γ
v +X′iδ
v + εvi , (1)
where pi is the price of car i, and X
′
i is a vector of observable car characteristics, f (·)
is a polynomial function of car age, ai, and captures the continuous relationship be-
13See Figure A.1 in Online Appendix A for the same analysis using raw price data.
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tween the age of a car and its price.14 We also include seven (one for each of the
seven registration-year thresholds covered by our sample) dummy variables, Dvyi that
indicate whether a car has crossed a given vintage threshold. The corresponding β vy
coefficients are the parameters of interest, as they measure the discontinuous differ-
ence in prices – conditional on precise car age ai – between cars that were registered
in subsequent years. The intuition of this approach is that the coarse registration-year
information should have no additional impact on car prices, once the much finer car-
age information is accounted for.
Table 2 presents estimation results for Regression 1 with varying sets of controls.15
Column (1) merely controls for a fifth-order age polynomial and the full set of thresh-
old indicators and provides estimates of the price discontinuities before accounting
for any heterogeneity in the car population. Given the important role of (thus far
uncontrolled) model updates, these somewhat unsystematic results should be inter-
preted with caution. In Columns (2) through (5), we increase the number of control
variables. Column (2) adds controls for the car features listed in Table 1, which sub-
stantially increases R2 and affects significance, size, and in some cases even the sign
of the coefficients. In Column (3) we augment the control vector by information on
model updates while Column (4) includes model fixed effects. Column (5) is the
most encompassing specification as it simultaneously controls for all of the aforemen-
tioned characteristics. Once heterogeneity in car features is accounted for, five out of
seven of the coefficients of interest are significantly negative, whereas the other two
are indistinguishable from zero. These results closely mirror the graphical analysis
above and provide strong evidence for systematic price discontinuities when passing
vintage threshold, even after controlling for precise car age and a large number of
additional car features.
The estimated discontinuities are also economically significant. For instance, the
average price drop at vintage thresholds in the specification without car-model fixed
effects (Column (3)) is EUR 418.79, whereas the average devaluation within vintages
amounts to only EUR 79.80 per month. Assuming a linear relationship between car
prices and age allows for a back-of-the-envelope approximation of an inattention
parameter in the spirit of Lacetera et al. (2012):16 The average car in our sample
loses EUR 1,296.59 per year in value, which implies an inattention parameter of
418.79
1,296.59
= 0.32, suggesting that roughly 32% of the annual depreciation occurs in a
14In our main specification, we use a fifth-order polynomial to control for age. This specific func-
tional form was chosen based on the Akaike Information-Criterion Test. Our results are robust to
using lower-order and higher-order polynomials, as discussed in Section 4.
15The drop in sample size from Column (1) to Column (2) is due to variation in the availability of
information on certain car features, especially horsepower, engine displacement, transmission kind,
and fuel kind.
16While this specific functional form is unlikely to be the best fit for our data, it is a simplification
commonly used in the literature, see, e.g., DellaVigna (2009) or Lacetera et al. (2012).
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Table 2. The impact of vintage thresholds on car prices
Dependent variable: Car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Indicator for...
...FR before 2007 430.7* 54.7 -203.0 -14.4 -221.4* -219.0* -848.8*
(176.9) (108.4) (108.0) (92.1) (91.8) (92.4) (394.5)
...FR before 2006 -501.8*** -613.7*** -858.4*** -580.5*** -780.3*** -796.1*** -570.5*
(116.4) (66.0) (67.5) (55.4) (56.6) (56.8) (281.2)
...FR before 2005 -1228.1*** -581.3*** -698.6*** -516.0*** -609.2*** -530.4*** -744.0***
(96.0) (63.5) (63.6) (54.6) (54.9) (59.5) (156.6)
...FR before 2004 576.9*** -51.0 -23.7 -30.7 -3.7 87.0 -551.6***
(119.5) (87.4) (87.1) (79.2) (77.7) (84.0) (167.8)
...FR before 2003 -42.0 -61.6 -129.6 105.6 44.3 124.7 -339.6**
(100.5) (77.2) (76.8) (69.4) (68.9) (81.0) (128.8)
...FR before 2002 -895.0*** -394.3*** -568.4*** -293.2*** -437.9*** -412.9*** -383.6**
(107.2) (88.7) (88.6) (82.7) (83.5) (101.5) (142.2)
...FR before 2001 -959.6*** -414.2*** -449.7*** -316.7*** -345.1*** -387.5*** -108.6
(94.1) (93.7) (93.5) (90.9) (91.7) (112.3) (146.5)
Controls
- Car-age polynomial X X X X X X X
- Car features X X X X X X
- Car-model updates X X X X
- Car-model fixed effects X X X X
- Seller type X X X X X
Sample selection
- Commercial sellers X X X X X X
- Private sellers X X X X X X
R2 0.4543 0.8148 0.8161 0.8576 0.8584 0.8630 0.8376
N 63,340 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 43,020 7,852
Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see Section 3.1). Depicted are estimates for β vy .
FR stands for “first registered”. Car age is controlled for by a fifth-order polynomial (chosen based on the
Akaike Information Criterion Test). Car features include all car characteristics listed in Table 1. Seller
type distinguishes between commercial and private sellers. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
threshold month – a value that falls well within the range of inattention parameters
documented in the literature (see DellaVigna, 2009).17
We continue by studying the heterogeneity of results with respect to the identity of
the vendor and stratify our sample by seller type. Column (6) re-estimates the speci-
17For comparison, the specification with car-model fixed effects (Column (5)) yields a slightly




fication from Column (5) in a sample of commercial sellers. Given that such institu-
tional vendors make up almost 90% of our sample, it is hardly surprising that results
closely mirror those from the main analysis. Interestingly, results become even more
consistent in a sample of private sellers (Column (7)). Not only do we find negative
discontinuities at all seven thresholds, but the average price drop is also significantly
larger than for professional sellers (EUR 506.67 vs. EUR 304.88). This provides sug-
gestive evidence that less experienced market participants may be more susceptible
to underestimating the importance of accounting for the exact registration date when
evaluating their car and setting the price.
A threat for identification in research-discontinuity settings is manipulative sorting
around the thresholds, since asymmetric supply may potentially drive the observed
price drops. Recall that we should not expect any anomalous bunching in the vintage
dimension because the date of first registration is an inherent feature of a used car
that cannot be changed by expediting or delaying its sale. Hence, it is impossible to
strategically alter a car’s relative position to the vintage thresholds. In fact, Figure 5
documents that there are no systematic differences in the supply of December and
January cars but that the distribution of used-car offers follows the same seasonal
pattern as that for new cars (see Section 2.3).
While we deem it plausible to interpret the uncovered discontinuities as due to
inattention, our results could potentially be driven by other factors as well. For in-
stance, unobservable heterogeneity around registration-year thresholds could pro-
duce similar patterns in the data. To use an example by an anonymous referee, cars
that were first registered in December, say as a Christmas gift, may have been treated
systematically different than cars that were first registered in January. While it will
always be possible to construct such examples of alternative explanations as long
as there is unobservable information – which is invariably the case in any empirical
work with observational data – there are several features of the German market for
new cars that work in our favor: In most cases, buyers of factory-new cars are unable
to choose precisely when their car is delivered and, consequently, first registered.
With waiting periods ranging from several weeks to even months (depending on the
specific car model), the actual purchase of “December cars” and “January cars” (ac-
cording to their first registration) will likely have occurred in the preceding fall. For
the purpose of our study, this waiting time is an advantage, as it adds randomness to
the date of first registration. As a result, the initial buyer lacks full control over the
timing of events, which moves us closer to an ideal experiment where registration
dates would be randomly allocated. Moreover, uncontrolled climatic differences are
unlikely to be at work either because German Decembers and Januaries are equally
prone to snow and the use of corroding road salt. There are also no general market
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patterns that would suggest differences in prices (including discounts) or the amount
of cars sold between December and January when the cars were new.18
In a similar vein, another anonymous referee suggested that a discussion of car
warranties – which could potentially be behind the vintage discontinuities – was war-
ranted. In Germany, there is a legally mandated two-year warranty for any product
upon purchase.19 In addition, car manufacturers often provide additional voluntary
warranties that are defined for a certain time period (usually two years) after first reg-
istration. Since our data is from the summer of 2009, the vast majority of warranties
in our sample will already have expired, and even the ones that are still effective
are not on the brink of systematically elapsing for December cars. For these reasons,
it is highly unlikely that product warranties can explain the observed price drops at
vintage thresholds.
While our case against the confounding influence of unobservable heterogeneity
relies on verbal arguments alone, we are able to methodologically address the issue
of observable heterogeneity around vintage thresholds. In Appendix B, we show that
there are no systematic changes in observable car characteristics (other than price) at
vintage thresholds, which suggests that December cars and January cars are indeed
close substitutes and not drawn from inherently different populations.
3.2 Mileage discontinuities
We now turn to another car feature that could potentially be associated with price
discontinuities: the odometer reading as stated in the sales offer. Recall that our car-
mileage data is likely subject to misreporting, which may explain that our results in
this dimension are less robust than in the vintage dimension. Despite these concerns
of measurement error, we are able to replicate the main findings by Lacetera et al.
(2012).
Graphical analysis
We begin by plotting the price data as a function of car mileage. In Figure 8, each
dot shows the average adjusted20 residual price (after controlling for a second-order
mileage polynomial, car age, horsepower, model updates, horsepower, model up-
18For details, see the registration statistics by the Federal Office for Motor Vehicles and the monthly
discount index (“Rabattindex”) published by the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) at the Univer-
sity of Duisburg-Essen: https://www.uni-due.de/~hk0378/Rabatte_Index/CAR-Rabatt-Index-Dez12.
pdf.
19This type of warranty, known as “Gewährleistung”, also applies to the sale of used cars. However,
non-commercial transactions are exempt from this regulation – a fact that is in line with our data:
Controlling for car characteristics, cars offered by private sellers, not liable for Gewährleistung, are
roughly 10% cheaper than those offered by professional dealerships.
20Again, we adjust residuals by adding the estimated mileage polynomial and a constant.
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Figure 8. Average adjusted residual car prices by car mileage
Notes: Plotted are average adjusted residual car prices (after controlling for
car characteristics) as a function of car mileage measured in 1,000-km bins.
Vertical dashed lines indicate 10,000-km mileage thresholds. Solid lines rep-
resent linear fits between thresholds.
dates, and other car features) for all cars that lie in the same 1,000-km odometer
bin.21 The vertical lines represent 10,000-km thresholds. Unsurprisingly, prices de-
crease with mileage. Within each 10,000-km bin, prices decline continously but there
are systematic (albeit small) drops at the 10,000-km marks.22 With no apparent ex-
planation for the importance of 10,000-km thresholds, this result is in line with the
interpretation by Lacetera et al. (2012) that heuristic decision making plays a role in
the mileage dimension as well.
Regression analysis
The regression approach follows the same logic as that for the vintage thresholds. To
identify the 10,000-km mileage discontinuities, we implement an RD design where








m+ εmi , (2)
The dependent variable is the car price and controls for car characteristics are col-
lected in X′i. The continuous relationship between price and odomoter readings, oi,
21See Figure A.2 in Online Appendix A for the same analysis using raw price data.
22Note that the trend lines, while helpful to visualize the downward price trend within and across
bins, impair the visibility of the discontinuities. To see the latter, focus on the triangles right before
and after each of the 10,000-km thresholds.
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is captured with the polynomial function g(·).23 To measure the impact of crossing
a given 10,000-km threshold, we include ten dummy variables, Dmki. The correspond-
ing βm coefficients are the parameters of interest, as they measure the discontinuous
difference in prices – conditional on the exact (stated) odometer reading oi – when a
car crosses a 10,000-km mark.
Even though the graphical evidence appears less striking than was the case for
the vintage discontinuities, the corresponding regression results in Table 3 are reas-
suring.24 As before, Column (1) controls only for the mileage polynomial and the
full set of indicator variables. As we move trough Columns (2) to (5), control for car
heterogeneity becomes more encompassing. When accounting for all observable char-
acteristics in Column (5), each threshold coefficient is significantly negative and siz-
able, suggesting economically meaningful price discontinuities at 10,000-km marks.
The average price drop at 10,000-km thresholds in Column (3) amounts to EUR
367.33 compared to an average price decrease between thresholds of EUR 63.26 per
1,000 km. The corresponding inattention parameter in the spirit of Lacetera et al.
(2012) would be approximated by 367.33
936.65
= 0.39, implying that about 39% of the de-
preciation per 10,000 km occurs at the moment a car passes a threshold.25
When dividing the sample with respect to seller type in Columns (6) and (7),
results are markedly different from those in the vintage dimension, where the dis-
continuities were more pronounced and consistent for private sellers. In the mileage
dimension, the average price drop at 10,000-km thresholds is roughly the same for
private and commercial sellers (EUR 350.17 versus EUR 362.37). Moreover, the esti-
mates from the private-seller sample greatly suffer from increased imprecision, result-
ing in a less consistent pattern for this type of vendor. It is possible that this blurred
evidence is attributable to the measurement concerns of our odometer data, assum-
ing that commercial (and legally liable) vendors report car mileage with more accu-
racy than private sellers. On this account, it is not surprising that our results mirror
those by Lacetera et al. (2012) – who rely on verifiable mileage data from commer-
cial auctions – more closely in the subsample that is institutionally more similar to
theirs.
In contrast to the distribution of car age – and in line with expectations – Figure 4
provides evidence for manipulative sorting in the mileage dimension, as there is con-
siderable bunching of offers right before a car passes 10,000-km thresholds. This
may either be misreporting or the result of a strategic decision to sell a car before the
23In our main specification we use a second-order polynomial to control for mileage. Again, this
specific functional form was chosen based on the Akaike Information-Criterion test. The robustness
with respect to other polynomials is discussed in Section 4.
24Again, the drop in sample size from Column (1) to (2) is due to variation in the availability of
information on certain car features.
25Results from the specification with car-model fixed effects (Column (5)) suggest a nearly identical




Table 3. The impact of mileage thresholds on car prices
Dependent variable: Car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Indicator for...
...more than 10K km -1,582.4***-994.5***-1,022.9***-888.7***-905.9***-868.5*** -1093.1
(249.1) (174.2) (173.4) (160.8) (160.5) (162.5) (823.6)
...more than 20K km -1075.1*** -789.7*** -779.4*** -758.0***-749.2***-775.7*** -71.3
(164.7) (109.1) (108.3) (96.2) (95.7) (100.0) (301.7)
...more than 30K km -420.1** -359.1*** -368.6*** -362.3***-368.8***-416.6*** 101.3
(133.8) (83.1) (82.7) (71.6) (71.4) (75.0) (251.3)
...more than 40K km -576.3*** -372.6*** -378.8*** -424.1***-428.4***-382.2***-782.6***
(120.9) (69.8) (69.6) (59.2) (59.1) (62.2) (215.2)
...more than 50K km -442.4*** -146.1* -141.0* -168.5***-163.9*** -91.2 -568.3**
(113.7) (60.5) (60.4) (51.6) (51.6) (54.6) (180.4)
...more than 60K km -101.1 -210.7*** -212.3*** -241.2***-242.9***-243.9*** -162.9
(111.3) (57.5) (57.6) (48.9) (48.9) (52.6) (151.2)
...more than 70K km -586.8*** -221.3*** -220.0*** -235.9***-234.6***-207.7*** -272.4*
(106.2) (55.2) (55.3) (46.9) (46.8) (50.7) (138.5)
...more than 80K km -108.8 -143.9** -143.8** -213.3***-212.9***-201.5*** -247.9*
(103.0) (52.9) (52.9) (45.2) (45.2) (49.6) (119.9)
...more than 90K km -414.1*** -289.5*** -284.9*** -284.9***-281.8***-269.1*** -250.8*
(100.4) (50.7) (50.7) (43.8) (43.8) (48.6) (104.6)
...more than 100K km -71.2 -125.3* -121.6* -172.7***-169.6***-167.3*** -153.7
(103.5) (53.1) (53.1) (46.4) (46.4) (50.8) (114.7)
Controls
- Car-mileage polynomial X X X X X X X
- Car features X X X X X X
- Car-model updates X X X X
- Car-model fixed effects X X X X
- Seller type X X X X X
Sample selection
- Commercial sellers X X X X X X
- Private sellers X X X X X X
R2 0.2634 0.8141 0.8148 0.8572 0.8575 0.8595 0.8411
N 63,340 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 43,020 7,852
Notes: Results are for the main empirical specification (see Section 3.2). Depicted are estimates for βmk .
Car mileage is controlled for by a second-order polynomial (chosen based on the Akaike Information
Criterion Test). Car features include all car characteristics listed in Table 1. Seller type distinguishes
between commercial and private sellers. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
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odometer passes a salient (and value-destroying) threshold. In any case, it suggests
that sellers at least believe prospective buyers to be inattentive when evaluating car
offers. Importantly, this pattern does not provide an alternative explanation for the
observed price drops because excess supply of cars with odomoter values below the
thresholds should depress, rather than inflate, prices for cars in this crowded market
segment.
Unobserved heterogeneity in the car population around 10,000-km mileage thresh-
olds is unlikely to be a concern in the mileage dimension because – in contrast to the
vintage dimension – the relative position with respect to a threshold is neither an
innate car feature, nor subject to the way a car was used. In addition, none of the
manufacturers in our sample offers mileage-based warranties, eliminating this po-
tential source of confounding as well. Of course, one could argue that vendors who
strategically sell their car before a threshold is passed (or alternatively: who under-
report odometer values to boost the car value) may also systematically treat their
car differently. However, we believe such considerations to be largely speculative and
even the direction of any potential bias would be ex-ante unclear. This is why we limit




In Online Appendix B, we present an extensive set of robustness checks for our anal-
ysis in the vintage dimension. We start by examining empirical pitfalls typical for
research-discontinuity settings. In Figures B.1–B.4 we provide graphical evidence that
our results are not driven by changing market compositions around the thresholds.
We also perform placebo tests by creating indicators for artificial year thresholds. Re-
sults in Table B.1 document that these placebo thresholds do not exhibit systematic
discontinuities.
We continue by gauging the robustness of results to changes in the main empirical
specification. Since prices have a long right tail (recall Figure 6), it seems appro-
priate to log-linearize Regression 1. As results in Table B.2 reveal, this modification
produces even more consistent results. In our main specification, we classify a car as
having undergone a model update if its first registration occurred more than three
months after factories switched production. Table B.3 documents that results are ro-
bust to varying definitions of model-update dummies. Finally, results in Table B.4
show that our conclusions remain intact when using lower-order or higher-order
polynomials than those endorsed by the Akaike Information-Criterion Test.
18
Mileage discontinuities
Online Appendix C repeats the analysis from Online Appendix B in the mileage di-
mension. Figures C.1–C.4 provide evidence that cars to the left and to the right of
mileage thresholds are comparable in their observable charcteristics. Moreover, we
perform a placebo test by converting odometer readings from kilometers to US miles.
Given that Germany exclusively uses the metric system, US-mile thresholds should
be irrelevant even if heuristics play a role in decision making. Indeed, results in Ta-
ble C.1 show that all but the first 10,000-mile placebo thresholds are associated with
insignificant coefficients.
Empirical robustness of results with respect to changes in the main specification
is less convincing for the mileage dimension than it was for the vintage dimension.
For instance, log-linearization is not innocuous but even reverses results for some of
the 10,000-km thresholds (see Table C.2).26 While Table C.3 documents robustness
to varying definitions of model-update dummies, results are somewhat sensitive to
using mileage polynomials of orders higher than three, whereas lower-order polyno-
mials work fine (see Table C.4). However, note that specifications that accommodate
higher-order polynomials appear to suffer from multicollinearity and our statistical
software fails to provide the F-Test statistic, which suggests that results are in line
with expectations, as long as the econometric model is not misspecified.
A horserace
As a final robustness exercise, Online Appendix D implements a horserace specifica-
tion by jointly controlling for mileage and vintage thresholds. Results in Table D.1
show that both discontinuities exist independently of one another. Not only do ef-
fects in either dimension survive, but especially the vintage discontinuities are even
slightly more pronounced.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We study the price-setting behavior in a competitive market for used cars and pro-
vide empirical evidence for coarse information processing. Based on detailed field
data from one of Europe’s largest online marketplaces for automotive vehicles, we
document systematic and sizable price discontinuities at salient car-age and mileage
thresholds. The price difference between two otherwise identical cars across registra-
tion years (where one was first registered in January and the other in December of
the previous year) is up to five times larger than that between two cars first regis-
26However, given the concerns of measurement error in our mileage data, we are certainly not
inclined to call the findings by Lacetera et al. (2012) – who document systematic and sizable disconti-
nuities with more reliable data in the mileage dimension – into question.
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tered in any two subsequent months within a registration year. A similar pattern can
be observed in the mileage dimension at 10,000-km odometer marks, which is in line
with earlier findings by Lacetera et al. (2012).
Given the high-stake nature of a car sale, these price discontinuities are quite in-
triguing and raise the natural question about the driving force behind this behavioral
pattern. We argue that it can be explained by a simple model of limited attention in
the spirit of DellaVigna (2009), where the overall value of a car, V , is the sum of a
salient component, s, and an opaque component, o: V = s+ o. In the context of the
vintage (mileage) dimension, s would be determined by the registration year (the
left-most digit in the odometer reading), whereas the value o would be influenced by
the precise registration month (the digits to the right of the first odometer digit).27
Limited attention is modeled by the assumption that market participants perceive the
car value to be Vˆ = s+ (1− θ)o, where θ measures the degree of inattention. Note
that the opaque information need not necessarily be hidden or difficult to access. As
is the case with the exact date of registration and mileage of a car, o can be clearly
visible at no cost, but individuals – for some reason – fail to fully process it at rate θ .
The key question in this framework is what this reason might be.
On the one hand, inattention may be driven by bounded rationality. According
to this notion, individuals tend to follow heuristics, which imply optimization under
the constraint that processing information, while beneficial, is psychologically costly.
An example for such a heuristic is left-digit bias, which Lacetera et al. (2012) ar-
gue to be the psychological mechanism behind price discontinuities in the mileage
domain. Note that while left-digit bias – if applied narrowly – cannot explain that
the price difference between two cars registered in December 2004 versus January
2005 is larger than the one between January 2005 and February 2005, we do not
interpret our results in the vintage domain to be at odds with their interpretation. In-
stead, we believe that a more general notion of information-prominence bias (where
left-digit bias can be thought of as a special case) can accommodate both our find-
ings and those by Lacetera et al. (2012), and would be applicable to a wide set of
domains where underlying continuous characteristics are mapped into discrete cate-
gories (such as classifications of French wine, star-based reviews of hotels, or ratings
of financial assets). Future research will likely shed additional light on the generality
of inattention-induced discontinuities in other economic contexts.28
On the other hand, it is possible that inattention has a more rational footing.
DellaVigna (2009) (p.349) emphasizes that “in general, models of limited attention
can be rephrased as rational models with information costs in which less salient in-
formation has higher costs of acquisition.” While this alternative explanation seems
to be inapplicable to our context (where the exact information on mileage and reg-
27For simplicity, we abstract from the impact of other car features on V .
28In fact, in a recent study, Luca (2016) finds evidence for coarse information processing by con-
sumers when evaluating restaurant ratings from yelp.com.
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istration date is readily visible at no cost) at first glance, we argue that at least part
of the observed discontinuities may in fact be driven by implicit search costs. Our
intuition is that inattentive individuals will evaluate a given vehicle relative to the
average car from an easily accessible “comparison sample” (here: the same vintage
or mileage bin), while the more relevant comparison group consists of cars of similar
age or mileage, irrespective of the vintage or mileage bin they belong to. For instance,
a car first registered in December of 2006 should be contrasted with cars of compara-
ble age, say within a six-months window (cars first registered between September of
2006 and March of 2007). However, mobile.de’s search filter does not allow to adjust
inquiries for the precise month of first registration. In order to obtain the desired in-
formation, one would have to screen a substantially higher number of offers, namely
the entire universe of cars registered in 2006 and 2007. These potential search costs
discourage the comparison of offers across vintages and increase the likelihood that
individuals are simply unaware of the systematic price differentials.29
Discriminating between the relative roles of behavioral bias and traditional search
frictions in explaining price discontinuities is an important challenge for future re-
search (see Schneider, 2016 and Malmendier, 2016). On this account, Englmaier
et al. (2016) study an online market for virtual goods that exhibit similar price dis-
continuities in the age domain: the soccer-manager game hattrick.org. Their paper
exploits an exogenous change in the website’s search interface that resulted in the
elimination of search cost for precise product age and finds that while price drops at
thresholds were significantly reduced, substantial discontinuities remained.
The presence, persistence, and relevance of coarse information processing docu-
mented by this and other papers in various consumer-choice contexts has important
managerial implications. Clearly, the scope of applications is not limited to the auto-
motive sector but relates to any good for which consumers base their decisions on
salient parameters. Examples are, as mentioned above, financial products (ratings),
but also real estate (living space), computers (processor speed), or food (sugar con-
tent). For instance, in the area of product design our results imply that endogenous
product features should strategically stay below (sugar content of a beverage) or
above (living space of a new construction) salient thresholds. In case of exogenous
product features, attention needs to be devoted to making the “right” features salient.
Another relevant question aims at the economic and welfare implications of the
price discontinuities in the investigated used-car market. Given that a substantial
amount of cars will be overpriced relative to their objective characteristics, there
will be redistributive effects to the detriment of inattentive buyers. At the same time,
it is possible that overpricing leads to too little trade and a real loss in surplus, as
overly expensive vehicles may be shunned by rational buyers, causing a welfare loss
29Since the website’s filter mechanism only allows to narrow down search results along 10,000-km
odometer brackets, a comparable argument applies to the mileage dimension as well.
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among market participants who try (and fail) to sell their prohibitively priced January
cars. Similarly, owners of December cars may be discouraged to even put their car
up for sale at such low prices, reducing trade from the supply side as well. While
these inefficiencies make the case for the elimination of price discontinuities from a
social planner’s point of view, it is not clear that marketplace providers would favor
such action, too. Although market efficiency would likely be increased, a majority
of sellers might prefer the market segmentation because their products will appear
more differentiated than they really are, thereby weakening competition. Since in
most two-sided markets of this kind, positive prices are only paid by sellers, the
platform providers may have an incentive to cater to their preferences and hence
prefer to keep the discontinuities in place. Analyzing these implications for platform
pricing and more general industrial-organizational aspects are promising topics for
future research.
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Online Appendix for
“Price Discontinuities in an Online Market for Used Cars”
by
Florian Englmaier, Arno Schmöller, and Till Stowasser
Online Appendix A contains additional tables and figures that complement the data
description in Section 2.2 and the graphical analysis in Section 3. Online Appendix B
contains the robustness analysis with respect to results in the vintage dimension,
as summarized in Section 4. Online Appendix C contains the robustness analysis
with respect to results in the mileage dimension, as summarized in Section 4. Online
Appendix D contains the robustness analysis with respect to the horserace analysis,
as summarized in Section 4.
A Additional tables and figures
Table A.1. Overview of car-model generations
Make and model Model generation Production span
Audi A4 B6 (limousine) 10/2000 - 11/2004
(estate) 09/2001 - 11/2004
B7 (limousine) 11/2004 - 11/2007
(estate) 11/2004 - 03/2008
BMW 3 E46 04/1998 - 11/2004
E90 (limousine) 12/2004 - 09/2008
(estate) 06/2005 - 09/2008
Mercedes A Class W168 09/1997 - 09/2004
W169 10/2004 - 04/2012
Opel Astra G 02/1998 - 01/2004
H 02/2004 - 10/2007
VW Golf IV 10/1997 - 09/2003
V 10/2003 - 07/2008
Notes: Depicted are the production spans of model generations for all cars in our
sample.
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Figure A.1. Average car prices by car age
Notes: Plotted are average car prices as a function of car age measured on
a monthly basis. Age is measured relative to the date of first registration
12/2007. Vertical dashed lines indicate vintage (or registration year) thresh-
olds. Solid lines represent linear fits within each vintage.
Figure A.2. Average car prices by car mileage
Notes: Plotted are average car prices as a function of car mileage measured in
1,000-km bins. Vertical dashed lines indicate 10,000-km mileage thresholds.
Solid lines represent linear fits between thresholds.
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B Robustness analysis: Vintage dimension
B.1 Potential empirical pitfalls
Observable heterogeneity around thresholds
To assure that our results are not driven by differing car populations around the
thresholds, we check whether January and December cars are comparable with re-
spect to their average mileage (Figure B.1), their average horsepower (Figure B.2),
their average fuel type (Figure B.3), and the composition of seller types (private ver-
sus commercials sellers) (Figure B.4). These raw-data plots show somewhat erratic
but certainly unsystematic patterns, which suggests that the observed price disconti-
nuities are not driven by changes in the underlying market composition.
Figure B.1. Average car mileage by car age
Notes: Plotted is the average mileage of traded cars as a function of car age
measured on a monthly basis. Age is measured relative to the date of first
registration 12/2007. Vertical dashed lines indicate vintage (or registration
year) thresholds. Solid lines represent linear fits within each vintage.
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Figure B.2. Average horsepower by car age
Notes: Plotted is the average horsepower of traded cars as a function of car
age measured on a monthly basis. Age is measured relative to the date of first
registration 12/2007. Vertical dashed lines indicate vintage (or registration
year) thresholds. Solid lines represent linear fits within each vintage.
Figure B.3. Share of cars with regular fuel by car age
Notes: Plotted is the share of traded cars with regular fuel as a function of car
age measured on a monthly basis. Age is measured relative to the date of first
registration 12/2007. Vertical dashed lines indicate vintage (or registration
year) thresholds. Solid lines represent linear fits within each vintage.
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Figure B.4. Share of private sellers by car age
Notes: Plotted is the share of cars offered by private sellers as a function of car
age measured on a monthly basis. Age is measured relative to the date of first
registration 12/2007. Vertical dashed lines indicate vintage (or registration
year) thresholds. Solid lines represent linear fits within each vintage.
Placebo tests
In another important consistency check we perform placebo tests by creating indica-
tors for artificial year thresholds and testing whether these are associated with dis-
continuities as well. Even though we observe significant coefficients for a few placebo
thresholds, these are unsystematic, both with respect to their sign and their size. Re-
sults for three different placebo tests that move the vintage thresholds to the other
three end-of-quarter months – March, June, and September – can be found in Ta-
ble B.1.
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Table B.1. Robustness analysis (vintage): Placebo thresholds
Dependent variable: Car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
(1) (2) (3)
Indicator for...
...FR before 2007 -151.3 636.2*** -588.5**
(110.4) (146.0) (181.0)
...FR before 2006 79.7 455.0*** 466.8***
(55.5) (75.9) (90.3)
...FR before 2005 -263.0*** -305.1*** -224.5***
(57.3) (59.6) (57.4)
...FR before 2004 229.6** 18.0 195.0**
(77.4) (73.9) (65.3)
...FR before 2003 225.5** 177.7 374.6***
(73.6) (94.1) (93.7)
...FR before 2002 -131.6 -8.5 185.2*
(81.7) (89.4) (82.4)
...FR before 2001 -313.6*** -207.2* 104.6
(85.3) (98.4) (93.6)
Car-age polynomial X X X
Controls for car features X X X
Controls for model updates X X X
Car-model fixed effects X X X
Placebo threshold month March June September
R2 0.8586 0.8588 0.8588
N 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for β vy (see Section 3.1) when applied to the
respective placebo thresholds. FR stands for “first registered”. All regressions
include the original non-placebo December thresholds, for which estimates
do not significantly change. Control variables are the same as in the main
empirical specification. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level,
respectively.
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Table B.2. Robustness analysis (vintage): Log-linearization
Dependent variable: Log of car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indicator for...
...FR before 2007 0.024* -0.008 -0.041*** -0.032*** -0.043***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
...FR before 2006 -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.049*** -0.033*** -0.043***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
...FR before 2005 -0.087*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.034*** -0.039***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
...FR before 2004 0.017 -0.025** -0.020** -0.034*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
...FR before 2003 -0.014 -0.017* -0.020** -0.008 -0.007
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
...FR before 2002 -0.087*** -0.052*** -0.060*** -0.046*** -0.053***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
...FR before 2001 -0.111*** -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.070*** -0.071***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Car-age polynomial X X X X X
Controls for car features X X X X
Controls for model updates X X
Car-model fixed effects X X
R2 0.5340 0.8450 0.8416 0.8941 0.8945
N 63,340 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for β vy (see Section 3.1) after taking the log of car prices. Car age
is controlled for by a fifth-order polynomial (chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion
Test). Car features include all car characteristics listed in Table 1. Robust standard errors are
stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1%
level, respectively.
B.2 Robustness to changes in the main specification
Log-linearization
Since the distribution of prices is right-skewed (recall Figure 6), a sensible robustness-
check is to log-linearize Regression 1. As results in Table B.2 reveal, this modification
produces results that are even more consistent than those from our main specification,
which is particularly reassuring given the long right tail in prices.
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Alternative model-update indicators
In our main specification, we classify a car as having undergone a model update if its
date of first registration was more than three months after factories switched produc-
tion. Our results are robust to varying definitions of model-update indicators, which
suggests that the potential measurement error when assigning the model-generation
information is unlikely to be harmful. Table B.3 collects the results for the following
dummy definitions that we used for robustness analysis:30
• D1: Model-generation indicator (measuring fixed effects for each model gener-
ation) imposing no insecurity: We treat all cars registered one month or later
after the official model switch as being a new model.
• D2: Model-generation indicator (measuring fixed effects for each model gen-
eration) with five-months insecurity window: Like D1 but we treat the model
status of cars registered within three months after a model switch as unknown.
Effectively, these cars are not used to identify our model.
• D3: Model-update dummy imposing no insecurity: Takes on the value of one if
a model update happened in a given month.
• D4: Model-update dummy, with five-months insecurity window: Like D3 but the
five months after the introduction of a new model are also labeled as a model-
update month.
Alternative car-age polynomials
A key identifying assumption of any research-discontinuity design is that the contin-
uous relationship between the forcing variable (here: car age) and the outcome vari-
able (here: car price) is adequately captured by the polynomial function f (·). Since
this assumption is inherently untestable, the literature (see e.g., Lee and Lemieux,
2010) stresses that results should be robust to varying polynomial functions in or-
der to be credible. As can be seen in Table B.4, this is indeed the case, as our key
results stay stable even when lower-order and higher-order polynomials than those
endorsed by the Akaike Information-Criterion Test are used.
30We have also experimented with smaller and larger insecurity windows (three to six months) but
omitted these results to save space. Results are very similar.
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Table B.3. Robustness analysis (vintage): Alternative model-update indicators
Dependent variable: Car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Indicator for...
...FR before 2007 44.3 -56.5 126.4 -72.0 25.9 -33.8 -152.8 -158.6
(108.3) (89.4) (108.4) (90.7) (107.7) (91.8) (108.2) (91.9)
...FR before 2006 -603.2***-636.3***-524.5***-549.3***-581.0***-557.4***-833.6***-736.7***
(65.7) (54.0) (66.0) (54.9) (65.8) (55.3) (66.9) (56.0)
...FR before 2005 -725.7*** -83.4 -505.9***-352.0***-751.0***-643.2***-547.9***-492.1***
(62.7) (52.8) (65.3) (57.3) (64.3) (56.1) (62.8) (54.0)
...FR before 2004 -122.1 70.8 51.1 53.3 -192.6* -134.3 146.4 111.6
(86.0) (76.6) (92.7) (84.4) (88.1) (78.5) (87.6) (77.9)
...FR before 2003 -29.2 -314.9*** -29.7 -86.3 -177.9* 20.6 -67.0 96.5
(74.9) (70.1) (76.3) (70.8) (76.9) (69.1) (76.8) (68.9)
...FR before 2002 -417.2*** -202.4* -468.8*** -236.0** -399.4***-297.1***-568.3***-418.8***
(86.1) (84.6) (87.6) (84.3) (88.4) (82.4) (88.2) (83.3)
...FR before 2001 -379.4*** 83.6 -389.8***-542.5***-445.7***-340.2***-402.9***-308.9***
(91.4) (91.4) (98.0) (97.3) (94.1) (91.9) (93.2) (91.7)
Car-age polynomial X X X X X X X X
Controls for car features X X X X X X X X
Car-model fixed effects X X X X
Controls for model updates D1 D1 D2 D2 D3 D3 D4 D4
R2 0.8179 0.8650 0.8203 0.8621 0.8169 0.8587 0.8163 0.8583
N 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for β vy (see Section 3.1) for varying model-update indicators. Main-
specification benchmark: A car is classified as a new model if its date of first registration is more
than three months after an official model launch. D1: Model-generation indicator imposing no inse-
curity (all cars registered at least one month after an official model launch are classified as a new
model). D2: Model-generation indicator with five-months insecurity window (like D1 but the model
status of cars registered within five months after a model launch is treated as unknown). D3: Model-
update indicator imposing no insecurity (takes on the value of one if a model update happened in a
given month). D4: Model-update dummy, with five-months insecurity window (like D3 but the three
months after a market launch are also labeled as a model-update month). Car age is controlled for
by a fifth-order polynomial (chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion Test). Car features
include all car characteristics listed in Table 1. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
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Table B.4. Robustness analysis (vintage): Alternative car-age polynomials
Dep. Variable: Car price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indicator for...
...FR before 2007 -136.7 45.1 -325.7** -606.1*** -677.9***
(93.8) (105.9) (116.6) (130.5) (141.1)
...FR before 2006 -276.8*** -654.7*** -575.8*** -436.3*** -397.0***
(51.1) (60.4) (64.5) (66.6) (70.9)
...FR before 2005 -512.7*** -908.7*** -306.0*** -330.0*** -389.4***
(60.2) (63.8) (69.8) (69.2) (72.0)
...FR before 2004 -898.5*** -514.2*** -205.7* -499.4*** -465.3***
(76.2) (72.6) (86.6) (97.9) (96.4)
...FR before 2003 -266.7*** -199.9*** -464.8*** -334.4*** -269.0**
(62.8) (75.5) (87.1) (87.1) (92.0)
...FR before 2002 -160.6 -100.6 -319.2*** -119.8 -203.7*
(68.3) (81.3) (88.1) (93.4) (96.7)
...FR before 2001 114.2 -208.7* -344.5*** -23.2 -272.5*
(91.1) (89.9) (102.0) (112.1) (116.7)
Order of age polynomial 3rd 4th 6th 7th 8th
Controls for car features X X X X X
Controls for model updates X X X X X
Car-model fixed effects X X X X X
R2 0.8594 0.8185 0.8178 0.8179 0.8179
N 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for β vy (see Section 3.1) for varying car-age polynomials. The main-
specification benchmark is a fifth-order polynomial (chosen based on the Akaike Information Crite-
rion Test). Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi-
cance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
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C Robustness analysis: Mileage dimension
C.1 Potential empirical pitfalls
Observable heterogeneity around thresholds
To assure that our results are not driven by differing car populations around the
thresholds, we check whether cars to the left and to the right of 10,000-km marks
are comparable with respect to their average mileage (see Figure C.1), their average
horsepower (see Figure C.2), their average fuel type (see Figure C.3), and the com-
position of seller types (private versus commercials sellers) (see Figure C.4). As was
the case for the vintage thresholds, these raw data plots show erratic but unsystem-
atic patterns, which suggests that the observed price discontinuities are not driven by
changes in the underlying market composition.
Figure C.1. Average car age by car mileage
Notes: Plotted is the average age of traded cars as a function of car mileage
measured in 1,000-km bins. Vertical dashed lines indicate 10,000-km thresh-
olds. Solid lines represent linear fits between thresholds.
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Figure C.2. Average horsepower by car mileage
Notes: Plotted is the average horsepower of traded cars as a function of car
mileage measured in 1,000-km bins. Vertical dashed lines indicate 10,000-km
thresholds. Solid lines represent linear fits between thresholds.
Figure C.3. Share of cars with regular fuel by car mileage
Notes: Plotted is the share of traded cars with regular fuel as a function of car
mileage measured in 1,000-km bins. Vertical dashed lines indicate 10,000-km
thresholds. Solid lines represent linear fits between thresholds.
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Figure C.4. Share of private sellers by car mileage
Notes: Plotted is the share of cars offered by private sellers as a function of car
mileage measured in 1,000-km bins. Vertical dashed lines indicate 10,000-km
thresholds. Solid lines represent linear fits between thresholds.
Placebo test
For our placebo test in the mileage dimension, we convert odometer readings from
kilometers to US miles and check for discontinuities in the converted data at 10,000-
mile thresholds. Given that Germany exclusively uses the metric system, US miles
thresholds should be irrelevant even if heuristics play a role in decision making. As
is apparent from Table C.1, all but the very first 10,000-mile placebo threshold are
statistically indistinguishable from zero, which is in line with expectations.
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Table C.1. Robustness analysis (mileage): Placebo thresholds
Dependent variable: Car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
(1)
Indicator for...
...more than 10K miles -709.0***
(176.7)
...more than 20K miles -97.1
(131.3)
...more than 30K miles 1.6
(107.9)
...more than 40K miles -181.0
(79.3)
...more than 50K miles -105.6
(161.2)
...more than 60K miles -71.4
(74.3)
...more than 70K miles -45.3
(86.3)
...more than 80K miles 34.9
(126.8)
...more than 90K miles -101.6
(100.1)
...more than 100K miles -35.4
(85.1)
Car-mileage polynomial X
Controls for car features X
Controls for model updates X
Car-model fixed effects X
R2 0.8172
N 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for βmy (see Section 3.2) after converting the
mileage data from kilometers to US miles. All regressions include the origi-
nal 10,000-km thresholds, for which estimates do not significantly change.
Control variables are the same as in the main empirical specification. Ro-
bust standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
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C.2 Robustness to changes in the main specification
Log-linearization
As results in Table C.2 reveal, log-linearization of Regression 2 is not innocuous
and even reverses results for some 10,000-km thresholds. This pattern is puzzling,
since discontinuities in the mileage dimension have been convincingly documented
to be systematic and sizable by Lacetera et al. (2012). However, we are certainly not
inclined to call their findings into question but rather attribute the lack of robustness
to the concerns of measurement error in our mileage data.
Alternative model-update indicators
As was the case for the vintage discontinuities, our mileage results are robust to
varying definitions of model-update indicators. This suggests that the potential mea-
surement error when assigning the model-generation information is unlikely to be
harmful. Results in Table C.3 are for the same definitions of alternative indicators as
described in Section B.2.
Alternative car-age polynomials
As was the case with log-linearization, results in the mileage domain are somewhat
sensitive to using car-age polynomials of orders higher than three, whereas orders
of one, two (the main-specification benchmark), and three work fine (see Table C.4).
However, note that specifications that accommodate polynomials of orders higher
than three appear to suffer from multicollinearity and that our statistical software
fails to return the F-Test statistic, which suggests that results are in line with expecta-
tions, as long as the econometric model is not misspecified.
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Table C.2. Robustness analysis (mileage): Log-linearization
Dependent variable: Log of car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indicator for...
...more than 10K km -0.057* 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.060*** 0.058***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
...more than 20K km -0.033*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
...more than 30K km -0.001 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.051***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
...more than 40K km -0.015* 0.034*** 0.033** 0.031*** 0.030***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
...more than 50K km -0.016* 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
...more than 60K km 0.0107 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
...more than 70K km -0.030*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
...more than 80K km 0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.005*
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
...more than 90K km -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
...more than 100K km 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
(0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Car-mileage polynomial X X X X X
Controls for car features X X X X
Controls for model updates X X
Car-model fixed effects X X
R2 0.2930 0.8208 0.8215 0.8692 0.8699
N 63,340 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for βmy (see Section 3.2) after taking the log of car prices. All
regressions include the original 10,000-km thresholds, for which estimates do not significantly
change. Control variables are the same as in the main empirical specification. Robust standard
errors are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and
the 0.1% level, respectively.
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Table C.3. Robustness analysis (mileage): Alternative model-update indicators
Dependent variable: Log of car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Indicator for...
...more than 10K km -937.4***-1,143.9***-981.6***-1,024.6***-1,048.4***-926.0***-1,024.7***-903.8***
(173.9) (157.2) (173.5) (158.0) (170.7) (158.9) (173.6) (160.7)
...more than 20K km -762.3*** -788.6*** -775.0*** -756.6*** -739.2*** -722.1*** -784.0*** -754.0***
(109.0) (92.9) (109.2) (94.1) (105.4) (93.9) (108.4) (95.9)
...more than 30K km -322.2*** -455.7*** -355.0*** -378.9*** -353.5*** -356.8*** -369.9*** -367.9***
(82.9) (69.9) (83.5) (70.7) (81.4) (70.5) (82.9) (71.5)
...more than 40K km -351.3*** -480.9*** -374.2*** -442.3*** -367.3*** -419.2*** -380.9*** -428.5***
(69.5) (58.0) (70.6) (59.0) (69.1) (58.7) (69.7) (59.2)
...more than 50K km -131.0* -153.3** -160.1** -144.7** -145.5* -167.1** -146.9* -168.3**
(60.3) (50.4) (61.5) (51.7) (60.6) (51.7) (60.5) (51.6)
...more than 60K km -208.1*** -214.4*** -226.7*** -214.3*** -203.7*** -235.2*** -209.1*** -240.3***
(57.3) (47.6) (58.5) (49.0) (57.8) (49.1) (57.6) (48.9)
...more than 70K km -220.3*** -218.1*** -271.5*** -229.3*** -223.1*** -236.6*** -224.8*** -237.6***
(54.9) (45.3) (56.2) (47.0) (55.5) (47.0) (55.2) (46.8)
...more than 80K km -144.0** -201.8*** -134.4* -187.5*** -142.1** -211.1*** -138.8** -209.8***
(52.5) (43.7) (53.9) (45.5) (53.1) (45.4) (52.9) (45.2)
...more than 90K km -285.6*** -257.3*** -292.0*** -249.9*** -284.5*** -281.3*** -285.3*** -282.6***
(50.2) (42.8) (51.6) (44.5) (50.9) (44.0) (50.7) (43.8)
...more than 100K km -122.9* -182.4*** -146.0** -165.9*** -122.9* -169.9*** -128.5* -174.2***
(52.5) (45.4) (54.5) (47.6) (53.3) (46.5) (53.0) (46.4)
Car-mileage polynomial X X X X X X X X
Controls for car features X X X X X X X X
Controls for model updates D1 D1 D2 D2 D3 D3 D4 D4
Car-model fixed effects X X X X
R2 0.8160 0.8651 0.8173 0.8623 0.8160 0.8581 0.8148 0.8574
N 50,872 50,872 48,572 48,572 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for βmy (see Section 3.2) for varying model-update indicators. Main-
specification benchmark: A car is classified as a new model if its date of first registration is more than
three months after an official model launch. D1: Model-generation indicator imposing no insecurity
(all cars registered at least one month after an official model launch are classified as a new model).
D2: Model-generation indicator with five-months insecurity window (like D1 but the model status
of cars registered within five months after a model launch is treated as unknown). D3: Model-
update indicator imposing no insecurity (takes on the value of one if a model update happened
in a given month). D4: Model-update dummy, with five-months insecurity window (like D3 but
the three months after a market launch are also labeled as a model-update month). Car mileage
is controlled for by a second-order polynomial (chosen based on the Akaike Information Criterion
Test). Car features include all car characteristics listed in Table 1. Robust standard errors are stated
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level,
respectively.
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Table C.4. Robustness analysis (mileage): Alternative car-mileage polynomials
Dep. Variable: Car price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indicator for...
...more than 10K km -1,039.5*** -804.1*** -585.7*** -476.5** 999.2**
(161.6) (178.0) (178.0) (183.3) (313.4)
...more than 20K km -864.1*** -558.2*** -337.6*** -233.1 392.6*
(98.9) (117.6) (118.6) (126.9) (184.4)
...more than 30K km -463.1*** -143.2 67.9 161.7 214.3
(75.3) (93.6) (93.8) (101.9) (127.2)
...more than 40K km -524.7*** -175.4* 19.7 100.2 -151.8
(62.6) (81.7) (82.5) (90.2) (115.0)
...more than 50K km -249.5*** 83.6 254.4*** -319.2*** -20.3
(55.5) (71.6) (71.9) (77.8) (96.0)
...more than 60K km -369.1*** -38.7 114.7 167.7* -138.7
(55.3) (67.7) (67.8) (72.3) (84.0)
...more than 70K km -352.6*** -39.0 103.9 148.0* -99.2
(53.3) (65.0) (64.9) (68.4) (78.6)
...more than 80K km -344.9*** 10.7 131.4* 163.8** 6.4
(51.9) (60.7) (60.4) (62.6) (75.5)
...more than 90K km -412.2*** -126.2* -15.9 9.0 -96.4
(50.0) (58.0) (57.3) (58.9) (75.6)
...more than 100K -297.5*** -11.6 77.6 93.7 30.8
(51.2) (58.2) (57.7) (58.5) (74.9)
Order of mileage polynomial 1st 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Controls for car features X X X X X
Controls for model updates X X X X X
Car-model fixed effects X X X X X
R2 0.8605 0.8183 0.8184 0.8184 0.8178
N 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for βmy (see Section 3.2) for varying car-mileage polynomials. The
main-specification benchmark is a second-order polynomial (chosen based on the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion Test). Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
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D Robustness analysis: Horserace
As a final robustness exercise, we implement a horserace specification by controlling
for mileage and vintage thresholds at the same time. Results in Table D.1 show that
both discontinuities exist independently of one another. Not only do effects in either
dimension survive, but especially the vintage discontinuities are even slightly more
pronounced.
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Table D.1. Robustness analysis: Horserace between vintage and mileage discontinuities
Dependent variable: Car prices
Regression coefficients
(Robust standard errors in brackets)
(1) (2) (3)
Indicator for...
...older than 2007 -221.4* -265.7**
(91.8) (90.1)
...older than 2006 -780.3*** -805.9***
(56.6) (55.5)
...older than 2005 -609.2*** -610.0***
(54.9) (54.1)
...older than 2004 -3.7 7.9
(77.7) (71.9)
...older than 2003 44.3 56.4
(68.9) (67.5)
...older than 2002 -437.9*** -441.3***
(83.5) (83.2)
...older than 2001 -345.1*** -385.8***
(91.7) (90.6)
...more than 10K km -905.9*** -719.3**
(160.5) (159.5)
...more than 20K km -749.2*** -550.9***
(95.7) (93.4)
...more than 30K km -368.8*** -140.5*
(71.4) (69.8)
...more than 40K km -428.4*** -218.2***
(59.2) (56.9)
...more than 50K km -163.9*** -84.2
(51.6) (49.9)
...more than 60K km -242.9*** -174.2***
(48.9) (47.6)
...more than 70K km -234.6*** -190.7***
(46.8) (45.7)
...more than 80K km -212.9*** -210.8***
(45.2) (44.0)
...more than 90K km -281.8*** -290.3***
(43.8) (42.8)
...more than 100K km -169.6*** -185.0***
(46.4) (45.3)
Car-age polynomial X X
Car-mileage polynomial X X
Controls for car features X X X
Controls for model updates X X X
Car-model fixed effects X X X
R2 0.8584 0.8575 0.8661
N 50,872 50,872 50,872
Notes: Depicted are estimates for β vy and β
m
y when jointly controlling for car vintage and car
mileage (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Control variables are the same as in the main empirical
specification. Robust standard errors are stated in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 5%, the 1%, and the 0.1% level, respectively.
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